can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): check actual_length before accessing data

Vulnerability Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): check actual_length before accessing data The URB received in gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() contains a struct gs_host_frame. The length of the data after the header depends on the gs_host_frame hf::flags and the active device features (e.g. time stamping). Introduce a new function gs_usb_get_minimum_length() and check that we have at least received the required amount of data before accessing it. Only copy the data to that skb that has actually been received. [mkl: rename gs_usb_get_minimum_length() -> +gs_usb_get_minimum_rx_length()]

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ffac725154cf6a253f5e6aa0c8946232b6a0af5
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad55004a3cb5b41ef78aa6c09e7bc5a489ba652b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb0c7c77a7ae3a2c3404b7d0173b8739a754b513
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/395d988f93861101ec89d0dd9e3b876ae9392a5b