WilderForge vulnerable to code Injection via GitHub Actions Workflows

Vulnerability Description

WilderForge is a Wildermyth coremodding API. A critical vulnerability has been identified in multiple projects across the WilderForge organization. The issue arises from unsafe usage of `${{ github.event.review.body }}` and other user controlled variables directly inside shell script contexts in GitHub Actions workflows. This introduces a code injection vulnerability: a malicious actor submitting a crafted pull request review containing shell metacharacters or commands could execute arbitrary shell code on the GitHub Actions runner. This can lead to arbitrary command execution with the permissions of the workflow, potentially compromising CI infrastructure, secrets, and build outputs. Developers who maintain or contribute to the repos WilderForge/WilderForge, WilderForge/ExampleMod, WilderForge/WilderWorkspace, WilderForge/WildermythGameProvider, WilderForge/AutoSplitter, WilderForge/SpASM, WilderForge/thrixlvault, WilderForge/MassHash, and/or WilderForge/DLC_Disabler; as well as users who fork any of the above repositories and reuse affected GitHub Actions workflows, are affected. End users of any the above software and users who only install pre-built releases or artifacts are not affected. This vulnerability does not impact runtime behavior of the software or compiled outputs unless those outputs were produced during exploitation of this vulnerability. A current workaround is to disable GitHub Actions in affected repositories, or remove the affected workflows.

References

• https://github.com/WilderForge/WilderForge/security/advisories/GHSA-m6r3-c73x-8fw5
• https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/javascript/js-actions-command-injection
• https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#preventing-script-injection
• https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#understanding-the-risk-of-script-injection
• https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input