vsock/virtio: Validate length in packet header before skb_put()

Vulnerability Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/virtio: Validate length in packet header before skb_put() When receiving a vsock packet in the guest, only the virtqueue buffer size is validated prior to virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put(). Unfortunately, virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put() uses the length from the packet header as the length argument to skb_put(), potentially resulting in SKB overflow if the host has gone wonky. Validate the length as advertised by the packet header before calling virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put().

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/969b06bd8b7560efb100a34227619e7d318fbe05
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee438c492b2e0705d819ac0e25d04fae758d8f8f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/faf332a10372390ce65d0b803888f4b25a388335
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/676f03760ca1d69c2470cef36c44dc152494b47c
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0dab92484474587b82e8e0455839eaf5ac7bf894