Matrix iOS SDK vulnerable to impersonation via forwarded Megolm sessions

Vulnerability Description

Matrix iOS SDK allows developers to build iOS apps compatible with Matrix. Prior to version 0.23.19, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages appearing to have come from another person. Such messages will be marked with a grey shield on some platforms, but this may be missing in others. This attack is possible due to the matrix-ios-sdk implementing a too permissive key forwarding strategy. The default policy for accepting key forwards has been made more strict in the matrix-ios-sdk version 0.23.19. matrix-ios-sdk will now only accept forwarded keys in response to previously issued requests and only from own, verified devices. The SDK now sets a `trusted` flag on the decrypted message upon decryption, based on whether the key used to decrypt the message was received from a trusted source. Clients need to ensure that messages decrypted with a key with `trusted = false` are decorated appropriately (for example, by showing a warning for such messages). This attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, so those who trust their home servers do not need a workaround.

References

• https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients
• https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-ios-sdk/commit/5ca86c328a5faaab429c240551cb9ca8f0f6262c
• https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-ios-sdk/releases/tag/v0.23.19
• https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-ios-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-qxr3-5jmq-xcf4