Ragentek Android software contains an over-the-air update mechanism that communicates over an unencrypted channel, which can allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges

Vulnerability Description

Android devices with code from Ragentek contain a privileged binary that performs over-the-air (OTA) update checks. Additionally, there are multiple techniques used to hide the execution of this binary. This behavior could be described as a rootkit. This binary, which resides as /system/bin/debugs, runs with root privileges and does not communicate over an encrypted channel. The binary has been shown to communicate with three hosts via HTTP: oyag[.]lhzbdvm[.]com oyag[.]prugskh[.]net oyag[.]prugskh[.]com Server responses to requests sent by the debugs binary include functionalities to execute arbitrary commands as root, install applications, or update configurations. Examples of a request sent by the client binary: POST /pagt/agent?data={"name":"c_regist","details":{...}} HTTP/1. 1 Host: 114.80.68.223 Connection: Close An example response from the server could be: HTTP/1.1 200 OK {"code": "01", "name": "push_commands", "details": {"server_id": "1" , "title": "Test Command", "comments": "Test", "commands": "touch /tmp/test"}} This binary is reported to be present in the following devices: BLU Studio G BLU Studio G Plus BLU Studio 6.0 HD BLU Studio X BLU Studio X Plus BLU Studio C HD Infinix Hot X507 Infinix Hot 2 X510 Infinix Zero X506 Infinix Zero 2 X509 DOOGEE Voyager 2 DG310 LEAGOO Lead 5 LEAGOO Lead 6 LEAGOO Lead 3i LEAGOO Lead 2S LEAGOO Alfa 6 IKU Colorful K45i Beeline Pro 2 XOLO Cube 5.0

References

• https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/624539
• https://www.bitsighttech.com/blog/ragentek-android-ota-update-mechanism-vulnerable-to-mitm-attack
• https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/94393/